Attention Ross and Grier: 21 lessons to be learned moving forward with the Dolphins
The Dolphins will introduce Mike McDaniel as their next coach at 10 a.m. Thursday, and for at least the immediate future, hope trafficking is acceptable, even encouraged for this beaten-down fan base.
That sure beats the always-available alternative of misery and exasperation with a franchise that can’t seem to find its way.
Dolphins fans who haven’t witnessed a playoff win in two decades can dream of bright days ahead, can fantasize about Yale graduate and offensive savant McDaniel lifting Tua Tagovailoa and this offense to the explosive heights usually required to win in today’s NFL.
If there’s a week to see things from a glass-half-full perspective, this would be it.
But owner Stephen Ross and general manager Chris Grier cannot lose sight of the past, either. Both must learn lessons from myriad mistakes made over the years.
Here are 21 such lessons to learn, to dovetail with 21 consecutive seasons without a playoff win:
▪ For Ross: Please don’t compare your new coach to Don Shula this week.
Ross did it with Adam Gase, and Gase was gone after three years. Learn to undersell, not oversell. And don’t compare anybody to Shula until they win a playoff game, at the very least.
▪ For Ross: If you’re ever going to tank again, learn how to do it correctly.
Ross has strongly denied Brian Flores’ most damning allegation, that Ross offered him $100,000 per loss in 2019 to dump games to allow the Dolphins to get a higher draft pick — a claim that the NFL is investigating. Regardless of who’s telling the truth, this much is clear:
This organization somehow missed the most obvious and acceptable — and organic - way to tank: Don’t sign Ryan Fitzpatrick, play Josh Rosen (which would have been justified after Miami traded a second-rounder for him) and give playing time to a few young players late in the season.
That’s old news now, but it remains inexplicable why Ross simply didn’t tell Flores he must play Rosen, or fire Flores if he refused.
▪ For Ross: Ask probing questions and don’t shrug off poor personnel decisions.
After dismissing Adam Gase and Mike Tannenbaum following the 2018 season, Ross explained his decision to keep Grier in a position of authority by noting that several unidentified people told him that Grier does a good job. Grier was named general manager in 2016.
But simple examination of some of Grier’s previous body of work - the 2017 draft - would have led more engaged owners to interview other candidates, too, and ask Grier some tough questions.
Such as: Why take Charles Harris (3.5 sacks in three years with Miami) over TJ Watt (56.5 sacks for Houston) in the first-round of the 2017 draft? (A source said the Dolphins were concerned that Watt might have been a one-year wonder in college.)
Did Ross not notice, in sticking with Grier, that Watt had 20 sacks in 2017 and ‘18, compared with three for Harris?
Why washout-cornerback Cordrea Tankersley in the third round, two picks before the Eagles took Rasul Douglas, who had five interceptions his first two years and five for Green Bay last season?
Did Ross ask Grier his role in the picks that didn’t work out during his nine years at college scouting director (such as Daniel Thomas and Jonathan Martin)?
Assuredly, blame was to be shared among many during those nine years, from coaches, to Bill Parcells, to Jeff Ireland for the Dion Jordan pick. But Grier was the one constant, and his job seems safer than ever.
Because Grier often deferred to Flores, it’s difficult to assess blame or credit for the picks that did and didn’t work in the past two drafts. But Ross needs to ask the questions that will lead him to better decisions.
▪ For Ross: Use your top employees more effectively, including team president Tom Garfinkel.
Instead of automatically promoting Grier, Ross should have had Garfinkel conduct an all-encompassing search for the best personnel men in football -- savvy scouts and evaluators and personnel directors who haven’t yet received their big break but have a history of wise recommendations to their GMs on personnel decisions.
Garfinkel should have been instructed to network, to make calls around the league and to present Ross a list of alternatives to Grier, either when Gase and Tannenbaum were dismissed after 2018 or at any point after that.
Even now, Ross should be asking Garfinkel to keep an updated list so he will be prepared with a list of GM options if this offseason’s personnel moves backfire.
That would have been a better use of Garfinkel’s time than having him focus on stadium upgrades, practice facility improvements or luring Formula 1 races.
▪ For Grier: Sometimes the logical move is the best move.
At times, Grier (and Flores) outsmarted themselves, such as ignoring Miami’s most glaring need (running back) and taking a cornerback (Noah Igbinoghene) 30th overall in the 2020 draft when one wasn’t needed, instead of Jonathan Taylor, who has an All Pro caliber runner for the Colts.
If you think you’re outsmarting everyone, you’re usually not.
▪ For Grier: Realize the organization’s blind spot.
Since he took over as college scouting director in 2007, the Dolphins’ success rate with drafted offensive linemen has been unacceptable (five quality starters among 21 picks). That’s not entirely on Grier, but he should have sought help in that area, or Ross should have instructed him to get help.
▪ For Grier: Don’t again put yourself in position to rely on four unproven starters on an offensive line.
The investment in youth was well-intentioned. But the results - aside from Rob Hunt’s play at guard - were mostly disappointing. Sign two proven, high-level veterans this offseason.
▪ For Grier: Don’t dump your best veterans at positions without a better alternative.
Kyle Van Noy would have been the second-best inside linebacker on this team (he also can play outside) and Ereck Flowers would have been the best left guard.
Instead, the Dolphins paid Flowers $6 million to leave; PFF rated him 17th overall among guards this season, higher than any Dolphins offensive lineman.
And instead of requesting a restructure, they simply cut Van Noy, who was an asset on a Patriots defense that was strong for most of the season before wilting late.
This was more on Flores than Grier, but the Dolphins look foolish when they sustain big cap hits to pay free agents to go away after a year.
▪For Grier: Stop believing you can get by at running back without investing prime resources at that position or putting together an elite offensive line.
Of the six offseason pickups in the past two years (Jordan Howard, Matt Breida, Malcolm Brown, Gerrid Doaks, Jordan Scarlett, Salvon Ahmed), none has had a significant impact. At least the Dolphins found a helpful piece in Duke Johnson, but it was too late.
No wonder the Dolphins finished 31st in the league in yards per carry at 3.5. Again, this was as much on Flores as Grier.
▪ For whoever is the Dolphins’ new offensive coordinator, replacing George Godsey and Eric Studesville: Stop running out of shotgun on third- and fourth and short.
Brown, whom the Dolphins mistakenly believed would be an effective short-yard back, produced just three first downs and 29 yards on 15 shotgun runs (1.9 per carry).
▪ For McDaniel and the new offensive coaching staff: Use a no-huddle offense more and use more designed rollouts than the previous staff did.
The Dolphins didn’t do either enough, even though Tagovailoa often is at his best playing up-tempo. In 2020, he began his Dolphins career by going 32 of 41 for 344 yards, no touchdowns and no interceptions (102 passer rating) when operating out of the no huddle.
McDaniel had great success with designed rollouts with the 49ers this season; doing more of that here would play to Tagovailoa’s strengths.
▪ For everyone on the football side: Don’t just say you want to build a tough, physical team. Do more to achieve it.
Why wasn’t a single quality starting offensive lineman (or any starting-caliber lineman) added in the free agency last season? Why has this regime never acquired a big, physical, clock-chewing, proven starting running back?
Why has the inside linebacker spot next to Jerome Baker been left to one-year low-budget players?
▪ For Grier: Be careful with extensions for kickers.
Jason Sanders, for all his good work in 2020, finished 26th in the league in field goal percentage at 74.2. The five-year, $22 million extension wasn’t necessary, because Miami wouldn’t have been at risk of losing him.
▪ For Grier: Don’t leave yourself in a position where you absolutely must fill a position in the draft.
By ignoring left tackle in 2020 free agency, Miami was essentially compelled to take the player considered the fifth-best tackle in that draft (Austin Jackson), even though receiver Justin Jefferson was the better prospect.
The Dolphins, that week, instead should have traded for the 49ers’ Trent Williams, the league’s best left tackle who was acquired from Washington for third- and fifth-round picks.
▪ For Grier and the entire organization: Don’t draft perhaps the fastest player in the draft and build a line so untrustworthy that you can rarely target him on deep throws.
Jaylen Waddle was used mostly on short and intermediate passes, and he excelled. But he’s capable of beating cornerbacks deep, much as Cincinnati’s Ja’Marr Chase has repeatedly done this season. This is clearly a case of the Dolphins simply not trusting their pass protection to get him the ball deep.
But the Dolphins crafted an offense around two dangerous deep threats (Waddle, Will Fuller) without having the ability or confidence to call plays that maximize them. That was short-sighted.
As a result, Waddle was thrown only 12 passes that traveled at least 20 air yards and caught four of them, none for touchdowns. Chase, playing in Sunday’s Super Bowl, was thrown 38 such passes and caught 16 of them, with eight touchdowns.
▪ For Grier: Don’t assume that players who have traditionally had durability issues will suddenly become healthy.
Will Fuller missed 27 games (21 due to injury) in five seasons before the Dolphins signed him. So they shouldn’t be surprised he has missed most of this past season.
Same with DeVante Parker, who had missed 10 games over the previous four seasons. (Parker’s strong seasons in 2019 and 2020 seemingly made keeping him less of a risk, so we give the Dolphins a pass with Parker.)
▪ For Grier: Don’t prematurely place players on injured reserve.
Lynn Bowden Jr., who would have been ready to play during the season, instead was regrettably placed on injured reserve before the final roster cut down, thus requiring him to miss the season.
The Dolphins could have released John Jenkins with the promise that he would be re-signed and placed Bowden on short-term injured reserve on Sept. 1, a move that would have allowed him to return after three games.
This, too, was as much on Flores as Grier.
▪ For Grier and the organization: Stop doing head-scratching things in free agency, such as overpaying for special teams players.
Was it necessary to give tight end Cethan Carter guaranteed money considering Miami had Mike Gesicki, Durham Smythe and Adam Shaheen under contract? Carter, guaranteed $2.7 million, barely played on offense.
And isn’t it possible to find reliable punt/kickoff return coverage players at lower salaries than Carter ($2.3 million) and Clayton Fejeledem ($2.5 million)?
▪ For Grier: Don’t let other teams hoodwink you.
According to reports, the Dolphins offered Arizona far more for Rosen (second and fifth round picks) than any other team did.
Rosen was gone after a year. The Seahawks drafted Pro Bowl receiver DK Metcalf shortly after the second-round pick that Miami gave the Saints for Rosen.
Grier deserves enormous credit for extracting a huge haul for Laremy Tunsil. But the Rosen mistake would have cost some GMs their jobs.
▪ For the entire organization: If you’re going to invest a high pick in a quarterback, do more to support him.
Find Tagovailoa a top-half-of-the league running back and quality bookend tackles and more receivers capable of getting open. How can you fully judge him without any of that?
▪ For Grier: Make sure you’re selective if McDaniel suggests signing a bunch of players who played for him in the past. Gase had more disappointments (Jay Cutler, Josh Sitton, Julius Thomas) than hits in this area.
Flores had a bit more success, but none of his Patriots pickups propelled Miami to postseason. Don’t assume a player is better than an alternative simply because you know him.
This story was originally published February 9, 2022 at 4:35 PM.
