Potential cost to move up for Tua and do these deals usually work out? What history says
No sooner did Tua Tagovailoa declare for the NFL Draft on Monday than the speculation began about what it might take for the Dolphins to move up in the draft to select the Alabama quarterback if they’re informed that another QB-needy team is ready to jump them for Tua.
The odds are against Tagovailoa being selected by one of the four teams picking ahead of Miami, though ESPN’s Mel Kiper said Monday that he could envision Detroit taking him at No. 3, even though the Lions have Matt Stafford and even though coach Matt Patricia is under immense pressure to win in 2020 to keep his job.
A year after selecting Daniel Jones in the first round, the Giants assuredly aren’t going to take a quarterback with their first-round pick at No. 4.
But it’s conceivable to think that the QB-needy Chargers (selecting sixth), Panthers (seventh) or the Jaguars (ninth) could try to jump Miami for Tua if they aren’t enamored with the other top quarterback options (Justin Herbert, Jacob Eason, Jordan Love).
The Lions could be receptive to a trade-up.
What about the Giants? GM Dave Gettleman, asked about not trading down a couple years ago, famously said: “People call you and they want the second pick of the draft for a bag of donuts, a hot pretzel and a hot dog. Leave me alone. I don’t have time to screw around.”
OK then.
So how much would it take for the Dolphins to rise from fifth to third, if the Lions tell them that the Jaguars or Chargers are offering a king’s ransom to jump them, presumably to take Tua?
For some perspective, we looked at the eight trades made this decade that involved an exchange of top 10 drafts picks and other assets.
The price varied widely, with the last one of these trades especially costly for the team that was trading up. But in more than half of these trades, the team that traded up ultimately regretted who they selected.
Here’s what history tells us, keeping in mind that we looked only at trades involving flips of top 10 picks, not deals such as the Rams dealing a pick in the teens to move up for Jared Goff:
▪ Trade 1: The Redskins, badly craving quarterback Robert Griffin III with the second pick in the 2012 draft, essentially gave up everything but their first-born for him, acquiring that second pick from St. Louis for first-round selections in 2012 (6th), 2013 (22nd), and 2014 (2nd), and a 2012 second-round selection (39th).
After a number of subsequent trades over the next two drafts, St. Louis ended up turning this pick (and its 2013 sixth-round selection) into the following players: offensive tackle Greg Robinson, linebacker Alec Ogletree, receiver Stedman Bailey, running backs Zac Stacy and Isaiah Pead, defensive tackle Michael Brockers, cornerback Janoris Jenkins and guard Rokevious Watkins.
Not all of those players worked out for the Rams, but Jenkins was a Pro Bowler and Ogeltree and Brockers have been productive pros.
Griffin, meanwhile, had a dynamic rookie season (20 TDs, five interceptions) but then shockingly flamed out, due in large to knee problems and general inconsistency, and lasted only two more years in Washington, throwing 20 TDs and 18 picks. He’s now the Ravens’ backup quarterback.
Bottom line: It was a mistake for Washington to give up that much to move up, though understandable at the time.
▪ Trade 2: In 2012, Minnesota traded the third pick to Cleveland for their first (4th), a fourth (118th), a fifth (139th), and a seventh-rounder (211th) that year.
Minnesota ended up getting the better player at 4 (offensive lineman Matt Kalil) than Cleveland did at 3 (running back Trent Richardson). Richardson was one of the draft’s biggest busts last decade, lasting 17 games in Cleveland and averaging 3.3 per carry in his career.
Bottom line: It was a mistake for the Browns to move up for Richardson.
▪ Trade 3: In that same 2012 draft, Tampa traded the fifth pick to Jacksonville for their first-rounder (seventh overall) and a fourth rounder (101st).
Jacksonville took receiver Justin Blackmon, who was the biggest bust among fifth overall picks this decade largely because of multiple NFL suspensions. Tampa took Mark Barron, who was traded to the Rams three years later.
Bottom line: It was a mistake for the Jaguars to move up for Blackmon.
▪ Trade 4: In 2014, Cleveland traded the fourth pick to Buffalo in exchange for the Bills’ 2014 first round selection (9th), and their first and fourth round selections in 2015 (19th and 115th).
Buffalo moved up to select Sammy Watkins, who had 17 TDs in three seasons before being traded along with a 2018 sixth-round draft pick, in exchange for a second-round pick and EJ Gaines.
Cleveland traded up to eighth and took cornerback Justin Gilbert, which lasted only 35 NFL games and had one interception, with his career ending with an NFL suspension. The Browns took center Cameron Irving at No. 19.
Bottom line: An awfully steep price for Buffalo to pay here. It wasn’t necessarily an egregious mistake for the Bills to move up but it probably was a mistake, because Watkins wasn’t the elite, perennial Pro Bowl receiver they hoped were they were getting.
▪ Trade 5: Cleveland moved up one spot to take Gilbert, giving Minnesota the ninth pick and a fifth rounder (pick 145). Minnesota moved down one spot and took linebacker Anthony Barr, a longtime starter and four-time Pro Bowler.
Bottom line: In typical Browns fashion, they moved up to get a far lesser player. An obvious mistake.
▪ Trade 6: In 2016, Cleveland traded the second overall pick and a conditional fifth-round selection in 2017 to Philadelphia in exchange for Philadelphia’s first-round, third-round, and fourth-round selections in that draft (8th, 77th, and 100th) as well as Philadelphia’s first-round selection in the 2017 draft and second-round selection in the 2018 draft.
Philadelphia took quarterback Carson Wentz.
Bottom line: The Eagles paid an enormous ransom for Wentz, but it looks like it will have been worth it; he had 97 touchdowns and 35 interceptions in four seasons, though injuries sidelined him for the Eagles’ 2017 Super Bowl run.
▪ Trade 7: In 2017, San Francisco traded the second overall pick to Chicago in exchange for Chicago’s first-, third-, and fourth-round selections (3rd, 67th, and 111th) as well as a third-round selection in 2018.
Chicago used the second pick on quarterback Mitch Trubisky. San Francisco used the third pick on defensive end Solomon Thomas.
Bottom line: This was a big mistake for the Bears. Trubisky has been a disappointment, and the Bears obviously shouldn’t have moved up but instead taken quarterback Pat Mahomes (who went 10th) or Deshaun Watson (who went 12th).
▪ Trade 8: In 2018, the Jets picked sixth and craved quarterback Sam Darnold but knew he likely wouldn’t drop to sixth.
So they called the Colts and acquired that third overall pick for a bundle: the Jets’ first-round selection (6th), two second-round pick (37th and 49th), and a second-round selection in 2019.
The Colts used that sixth pick on guard Quentin Nelson, who was an AP first team All Pro selection his first season and two of the second rounders acquired on starting guard Braden Smith and cornerback Rock Ya-Sin, while trading the other.
Bottom line: It’s too early to tell if Darnold was worth sacrificing all of those picks. With the benefit of hindsight, the Jets could have stayed at No. 6, selected quarterback Josh Allen and kept the other picks, with Broncos standout receiver Courtland Sutton and Eagles tight end Dallas Goedert among those who would have been available at those second-round spots.
Bottom line: The jury is out on whether this was a worthwhile trade for the Jets.
So let’s recap. Of the eight teams who traded a first-round pick this decade to land a higher first round pick in that draft, five clearly wouldn’t do the deal again for that player; another one probably should not have (Buffalo for Watkins), one assuredly would have (the Eagles for Wentz) and one can’t yet be fully assessed (Jets for Darnold).
So that’s six unwise trade-ups, one good one and one maybe.
Of greater importance to the Dolphins, at this point, is what it took to move up. Nobody moved up from fifth to third or fifth to fourth in any of those scenarios in this last decade, but what it took for the Jets to move from six to three (three second-round picks and obviously, the sixth overall pick) is worrisome, because that exact haul -- if needed here -- would eliminate three of Miami’s four second-round picks in the next two years.
The Dolphins - if they need to do this type of trade to get Tua - assuredly would hope what’s required is more along the lines of what the Bears gave up to move up one spot to get Trubisky (two thirds and a fourth), besides the first round pick flip.
And in a perfect but highly unlikely world for Miami, the compensation would be only one fourth rounder, which is all Jacksonville had to do in flipping the fifth and seventh picks with Tampa in 2012.
But we’re talking about a potentially high-demand quarterback here, meaning the Dolphins - and their fans - should be braced for a steep price if the Dolphins decide they simply must get Tua. (And that decision is a long way off, until the team examines his medical information in the months ahead.)
Would it be depressing to have to eat into that impressive treasure trove of picks? Of course. But it’s the price of doing business for a potential franchise quarterback, albeit a potentially fragile one.
Here’s my Tuesday piece with some insight on the man who coached the Dolphins’ Christian Wilkins and UM’s quarterback of the future Tyler Van Dyke.
Here’s my Monday night piece on Dolphins’ options with each of their three first-round picks.
This story was originally published January 7, 2020 at 8:09 PM.
