From interdiction to strike: How America’s narco war turned lethal in the Caribbean | Opinion

When President Donald Trump initially ordered military strikes purportedly on narcoterrorist “go-fast” boats from Venezuela speeding toward the U.S., I recalled my role as special adviser to the director of Joint Interagency Task Force South, which generally exercised tactical control of similar operations relating back to 2001, shortly after Sept. 11, when I was first involved.

At a time when headlines focus on dramatic images of “go-fast” boats being destroyed at sea, I hope this article offers something rare: a view from inside the system that in the past coordinated such operations. I can tell you what’s changed, what’s at stake and why questions about legality and oversight still matter when military power is used beyond America’s borders.

As a former special adviser involved in counter-narcotics missions, I had a front-row seat on how these missions were originally structured — to detect, monitor and interdict for purposes of prosecution rather than to kill. To date, reportedly more than 50 people have been killed in the “go-fast” boats being destroyed by the U.S. off Venezuela.

These recent strikes, ordered under a far broader interpretation of presidential authority, suggest a shift from law enforcement to combat posture and highlight how the rules — and risks — of maritime illicit drug enforcement have evolved.

I’m now far removed from these kinetic displays of force, but I can share lethal force wasn’t part of the mission.

The way it works, Joint Interagency Task Force South, located in Key West, brings together every branch of the U.S. military. This includes the Coast Guard (which has law enforcement authority the military doesn’t), the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the larger intelligence community and other key federal agencies, along with international partners that play instrumental roles through foreign liaison officers to stop deny large-scale illicit drug trafficking via maritime and air routes bound for the United States.

Established essentially as a tactical intelligence fusion center to conduct counter-illicit trafficking operations, the task force ultimately was realigned under U.S. Southern Command. Emphasis has been on detection, monitoring and interdiction for purposes of prosecution. If disabling gunfire was necessary, it was to stop drug boats, not to kill.

The task force has continually exceeded previously unattained levels of efficiency and effectiveness toward these ends. Its joint operating area is vast, covering 42 million square miles across multiple U.S. military and Coast Guard commands, including into the Pacific.

By contrast, Southern Command’s geographic area of responsibility spans much of the Caribbean, Central and South America, including Venezuela. It’s not necessarily clear from media accounts whether another Command also was involved in the strikes.

In Florida, beyond Key West and the Southern Command’s headquarters in Doral, the task force’s presence extends to the Tampa Bay area through an innovative prosecutorial initiative with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida focusing on narco-trafficking and transnational crime. It’s known as the Panama Express.

The task force is perhaps the quintessential case study in how separate and distinct branches of the U.S. armed forces can coordinate in support of a mission. Its framework arises out of legislation President Ronald Reagan signed into law — with bipartisan support — known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, responding to inter-service rivalries and poor communication and coordination that undermined operations.

Notably, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently announced a new Joint Task Force established under Southern Command to “augment counter-narcotics efforts across the Western Hemisphere” that’s characterized as a Marine Expeditionary Force, contemplating short-term capability to project ground forces, which has broad implications.

For me, the recent strikes of suspected narco-traffickers’ boats suggest the same high-speed chases and interdictions I witnessed years ago — but with a crucial difference.

Back then, the operations followed decidedly different protocols consistent with established rule-of-law considerations intended to bring traffickers to justice and also to develop actionable intel pursuant to arrest and prosecution, not lethal force.

Mark R. Schlakman serves as senior program director for the Florida State University Center for the Advancement of Human Rights, and is counsel to Rambana & Ricci. He previously served as interim foreign policy advisor to Southern Command Combatant Commander General Peter Pace, USMC, through the U.S. Department of State.