Surfside collapse may be rooted in the past. But accountability starts now | Editorial

In the search for answers in the Surfside condo collapse, revelations about the original construction plans are becoming increasingly troubling.

The 12-story building was completed 40 years ago, in 1981 — a lifetime in South Florida. Most of the people in charge of designing and approving the building are long gone. Condominium construction was going full-tilt in that era, but construction methods were weak, at least when it came to single-family homes, and so was enforcement of the building codes. We learned that painful lesson in 1992 after Hurricane Andrew flattened entire neighborhoods.

In a Miami Herald investigation into the Champlain Towers South condominium collapse, engineers consulted by the Herald said original design and construction flaws alone were unlikely to have initiated the collapse. But the deficiencies, they agreed, “could have been the difference between a single floor caving in and the kind of progressive collapse that killed 98 people on June 24.”

Design weaknesses

As one engineer said, Champlain Towers South was designed and built in a “wild and woolly time” in South Florida.

Does that mean the design itself was inadequate all along? There are worrisome indications, from the Herald story, of weaknesses in the amount of metal rebar, the size of the columns and the placement of columns to support concrete slabs.

Were codes not followed? Standard building codes of the 1970s should have been sufficient to prevent the progressive collapse of the building, the experts consulted by the Herald said. They pointed to the western wing of the tower that remained standing after the pool deck initially fell as proof. That wing, according to structural drawings, was designed stronger, with more rigidity. It was unclear from Surfside records if inspections at that time had been appropriate.

Could both of those issues have played a part? We don’t know yet, but the construction experts the Herald asked to review the plans were disconcerted by what they saw. One contractor called the building “a piece of junk,” saying the design problems “should have been picked up by everyone.”

All five experts consulted by the Herald — four engineers and a general contractor — agreed on that point.

No doubt the official investigations will probe those issues and others we haven’t even considered yet.

Who is responsible?

But before we start pointing fingers at people and institutions from four decades ago — out of reach as we seek to hold the responsible parties accountable — let’s make one point crystal clear: No matter where investigators finally pinpoint the causes of this horrific accident, we are not letting current officials, institutions and practices off the hook.

Ninety-eight people died thinking they were safe in their beds. There is no amount of shuffling blame to people from the past that makes that OK. And there are actions that we can — and must — take right now: enhanced 40-year building recertifications, inspections of older buildings, greater vigilance by condo boards, faster enforcement of the laws on the books and, when needed, the writing of new ones to detect flawed or decaying buildings.

Some, such as emergency inspections of buildings past a certain age, have already begun in South Florida and are producing startling results. Miami-Dade County’s historic downtown courthouse, a landmark in Miami, was partially shut down in July after a post-Surfside inspection raised alarms about its safety. Judges and lawyers had been complaining about it for years, but administrators had consistently declared it was safe after piecemeal repairs. If that was a disaster in the making, let’s hope it has now been averted.

Jade Winds saga

But for a real eye-popping example of festering problems now being uncovered, look no farther than North Miami Beach and the saga of the Jade Winds condominium. One building in the complex is 13 years past due on its 40-year recertification, the longest-standing unresolved recertification case for buildings flagged by the county after Surfside. And it’s still occupied.

Engineers have told the condo residents that the building is structurally sound and safe to live in, and the main problem seems financial. Repair costs exceed reserves. Bankruptcy and allegations of embezzlement have bogged everything down. Jade Winds seems close — finally — to getting its recertification, a unique South Florida requirement created to ensure the structural integrity of older towers after a federal building collapsed in the 1970s.

But 13 years? If recertification is truly about safety in older residential buildings, we cannot allow the process to drag on for more than a decade or we risk undermining exactly what it is meant to ensure. Thirteen years is simply unacceptable.

And as we focus on the process of safety benchmarks such as recertification, it’s also time to reevaluate what exactly we are measuring. As we absorb the lessons of the Surfside collapse, we’ll need to apply that tragically acquired information to our construction codes, design requirements and inspections, both when a building is built and many years later.

In Surfside, the collapse site has been cleared. The flowers on the memorial wall have withered. Funerals — so many funerals — have been held. Our vigilance, however, has just begun.

This story was originally published August 8, 2021 at 7:00 AM.