Under the prodding of U.S. diplomats, political leaders in Honduras have come up with a creative, albeit complicated, solution to help the country emerge from the paralyzing crisis arising from the ouster of President Manuel Zelaya on June 28.

The plan was agreed to last week by supporters of Mr. Zelaya and the head of the de facto government, Roberto Micheletti, with a powerful nudge from a U.S. delegation led by Tom Shannon, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs. It requires the Honduran Congress -- with the advice of the Supreme Court -- to ratify an agreement that allows Mr. Zelaya to finish the last few months of his tenure as part of a national unity government, under close monitoring to prevent him from overstepping his authority.

Keeping Mr. Zelaya on a tight leash makes sense. If he had not tried to hold a referendum that was widely interpreted as an attempt to get around the constitutional ban on running for a second term, none of this would have been necessary. The mistake -- belatedly acknowledged by the military and other opponents of the president -- was to kick him out of the country right after placing him under arrest, instead of giving him due process by bringing him before an impartial tribunal to answer charges.

Up to Honduran Congress

Under the reconciliation plan, the Supreme Court has an important role to play, but it's really up to the leaders of Congress -- above all, the presidential candidates in the upcoming election -- to make this work.

The quid pro quo is that if Mr. Zelaya is reinstated and allowed to finish his term, the international community will recognize the validity of the Nov. 29 elections so that normal diplomatic and commercial relations can be restored.

Porfirio Lobo Sosa, the candidate of the National Party, should be the first to endorse the deal. As the widely regarded leader in the race for president and as a member of a party that holds the key to congressional approval, his support would help cement the agreement and offer evidence that he has the leadership skills that Honduras needs.

The plan's chief virtues are twofold. First, it represents at least a tacit acknowledgement that Mr. Zelaya's ouster violated constitutional norms. It was a mistake for him to push for his self-serving referendum, but his adversaries could have handled the problem without arresting and summarily exiling him.

Second, it offers everyone involved a way out of the crisis without having to concede much -- i.e., without losing face. Both sides can claim a measure of vindication if Mr. Zelaya is restored but abides by the limits imposed on his authority to avoid new ventures like the ill-considered referendum.

One important lesson from the Honduran crisis is the continuing importance of U.S. leadership. Countries throughout the region offered a united front in rejecting the removal of Mr. Zelaya as unconstitutional, but it took a strong push by the Obama administration to come up with a solution that may finally put the affair to rest.

Message to Nicaragua

Along the way, some countries criticized U.S. leaders for failing to do enough to force an end to the crisis -- the same countries that usually rail against U.S. ``intervention'' in the region. Instead, the Obama administration wisely agreed to a multilateral approach by working with and through the OAS, but in the end there is no substitute for direct U.S. diplomacy.

The big loser in all of this is President Chávez of Venezuela, widely believed to have prodded Mr. Zelaya to undertake the referendum that sparked the crisis. Mr. Chávez was part of the problem but not of the solution. Other regional leaders tempted to listen to Mr. Chávez's counsel should keep that in mind.

That includes the president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, who has resorted to subterfuge to present himself as a legitimate candidate for reelection in a country bordering Honduras. Mr. Ortega claims the backing of the Supreme Court in a bid to run again, but it is patently clear that only a minority of Court justices were consulted. His tricks are laying the groundwork for a serious political grievance that bodes ill for the country's future.

Mr. Ortega, like Mr. Chávez and the ill-advised Mr. Zelaya, puts his personal political well-being above the needs of his country and the democratic aspirations of its people. If abiding by the constitution is good enough for Honduras -- as Mr. Ortega maintained when he demanded the restoration of Mr. Zelaya -- it is good enough for Nicaragua, and that means that Daniel Ortega has no legitimate claim to stand for reelection.