Chile is Latin America's success story. Per capita income has grown from $4,720 in 1990 to $13,936 in 2007. By leaving unperturbed market-based economic policies instituted in the 1980s, the Concertación, the center-left coalition in power since 1990, led Chile to where it is today. The next frontier is breaking the $20,000 mark in per capita income, which would denote the country's full passage to development.
It'll be a much steeper climb. Survey results by Latinobarómetro and CERC, two Santiago-based polling firms, paint a complex portrait of Chilean public opinion that explains why.
Take for instance the economy. In 2007, 30 percent expressed themselves to be very or somewhat satisfied with it. About 80 percent have consistently said that economic growth has largely benefited the rich. Close to 90 percent consider the private sector too powerful; most have unfavorable views of people in business.
These attitudes, which fly in the face of impressive progress, are stirred by the inequalities that democracy has barely touched.
• Some 85 percent discount that there is equality before the law.
• More than 80 percent see Chile in the vise of special interests.
• In the early 1990s, the perception gap between democracy's legitimacy and its efficacy was relatively small: about 85 percent and 75 percent, respectively.
• Since then, both perceptions have declined -- legitimacy stands at 74 percent, efficacy at 55 percent -- while the gap doubled.
Let's gain some perspective. Since 1987, poverty rates have fallen from 40 percent to 16 percent. Still, if Chile had levels of inequality comparable to South Korea's, more than a million Chileans would no longer qualify as poor. Reducing inequality while sustaining economic growth is no mean task, but that is precisely what Chile must do.
By cracking the inequality syndrome, which in part means significantly increasing average incomes through higher productivity and better distribution, Chile would also lead Latin America on a front that bedevils the entire region.
Increasing prosperity has ironically complicated matters. In 1998, 60 percent agreed that a market economy was best for Chile; in 2007, only 46 percent did. Between 2005 and 2007, the percentage agreeing that a market economy leads to development fell precipitously from 62 percent to 41 percent. Those considering private enterprise indispensable likewise declined from 72 percent (2004) to 59 percent (2007).
Chile's economy has slowed down. Nonetheless, I can't imagine that public opinion in South Korea, Ireland or New Zealand would so readily belittle the market in an economic downturn. More likely, it would blame politicians, which Chileans vehemently do as well.
• Whereas in 1991, 63 percent said that politicians did not care about people like them, 85 percent did in 2007.
• Asked if politicians think only of people like them when an election is coming up, 73 percent agreed in 1991 while 93 percent did in 2007.
• In 1991, 66 percent agreed that no matter who's in power, personal interests always prevail over the public good; in 2007, 82 percent did.
Politics, a long-standing Chilean strong suit, needs to midwife the current impasse. Twenty years ago Chile passed the transition test with flying colors. The Concertación -- a pact between Christian Democrats, Socialists and two smaller parties -- can take much credit, but so can the conservative opposition. Even Augusto Pinochet gets some points for exiting peacefully.
Now the threshold is consolidating democracy. The political class must reach across the aisle to find common ground on a series of issues such as buffering inequality, improving education, creating jobs, energy, the environment, increasing investments and streamlining the state apparatus.
Left and Right need to look beyond upcoming elections -- municipal in October, presidential in December 2009 -- because the problems that Chile faces loom larger than who's in power. A changing of the guard is no great tragedy; not meeting the charges ahead would be.
By the way, all of the above is actually good news: Chile's problems are the result of success, not failure.
Marifeli Pérez-Stable is vice president for democratic governance at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C., and a professor at Florida International University.
