SAFETY REFORM | THE MITSUBISHI MU-2

FAA reverses course on new training

BY RONNIE GREENE

rgreene@MiamiHerald.com

For years the Federal Aviation Administration denied a manufacturer's request to boost pilot training for a popular turboprop involved in multiple deadly cargo crashes.

Now, nearly 15 years after first being pressed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America to mandate more training for pilots flying the company's MU-2, the FAA said it will do just that.

The events leading to that conclusion raise serious questions about why the FAA took so long to suggest safety reforms, and whether pilots are solely at fault in crashes involving that model.

Efforts to increase safety on the MU-2 began in 1991 when Mitsubishi's Ralph Sorrells wrote the FAA asking that pilots pass specific tests before flying. But within three months the FAA replied: "it would be inappropriate for the FAA to establish a pilot type rating for the MU-2 aircraft."

Over the next decade, MU-2s would go down in a spate of crashes that alarmed safety advocates. With questions persisting, Mitsubishi turned again to the FAA in 2003.

"... Some pilots, qualified in less-complex multiengine aircraft, may not have received adequate training necessary to safely operate the MU-2B aircraft in certain flight conditions," Sorrells wrote. "Frequent training is essential for the safe operation."

Again, the FAA said no. It "was unable to establish that the fatal accidents involving MU-2s are extraordinary when compared to other light single and twin turboprop airplanes. Therefore ... we will not be able to mandate additional pilot training," Robert A. Wright, a FAA manager, wrote in March 2004.

Ten days later, in the first of a string of deadly cargo accidents, an MU-2 crashed in Massachusetts, killing Brian Templeton, 33, of Royal Air Freight. He was an "excellent pilot," said Kurt Kostich, Royal Air's director of operations, with 6,500 flight hours -- including 2,000 in the MU-2 alone.

The National Transportation Safety Board said the plane crashed "for undetermined reasons," but a recent wrongful-death suit alleges the plane was defective.

In May 2004, Thomas Lennon's MU-2 crashed near Baltimore-Washington International Airport, killing him. The safety board cited the pilot.

Two MU-2s soon crashed in Colorado, killing three, and both involving Flight Line Inc.

The December 2004 crash killed pilot Paul Krysiak, 28, and James Presba, 25. In May, the NTSB blamed the pilot's "failure to maintain minimum controllable airspeed," but victim families believe the plane is at fault.

"The obvious and well-documented technical problems with the design of the aircraft and repeated failures of one or more of its engines ... simply have nothing to do with pilot training," parents Jim and Linda Presba wrote members of Congress this Feb. 9.

In August 2005 came another fatal crash involving Flight Line, a division of American Check Transport, a 24-hour-a-day cargo company serving the banking industry.

In September 2005, a McNeely Charter Service plane crashed into a 62,000-pound piece of earth-moving equipment in an Arkansas construction site, killing the pilot.

It was the seventh deadly U.S. cargo crash involving MU-2s since 2000 -- second only to the Cessna 208B.

An earlier crash, in icy weather in Idaho Feb. 11, 2000, raises further questions about FAA oversight -- and the NTSB's rulings.

That crash killed a 67-year-old pilot flying a plane operated by American Check Transport.

The pilot had retired from a major airline before flying cargo and had more than 21,000 hours of flight time on his résumé. But that morning he reported a dual engine flameout. Just seconds later he crashed into a ridgeline a mile and a half from the runway at Lewiston Nez-Perce County Airport.

The NTSB said the pilot failed to follow the flight manual procedures "resulting in both engines flaming out when the air induction system was blocked with ice."

As a contributing cause, the safety board said the company industry service bulletin that "strongly recommends" operators install an auto-ignition system meant to avoid the precise problem encountered that morning in Idaho, reducing the possibility of engine flameout during icing. In fact, in 1995, Mitsubishi had issued a bulletin urging its installation.

But it wasn't until five years later that the FAA formally required it -- three months after the Idaho crash.

After the series of fatalities, U.S. Sens. John F. Kerry and Edward M. Kennedy and U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, all of Massachusetts, cited Lennon's BWI crash last September in urging FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey to review "whether the MU-2 has a place in the safest aerospace system of the world."

"The MU-2 has a disturbing statistical record in terms of safety," they wrote on behalf of the pilot's sister, a Massachusetts resident. "No more Americans should have to die piloting an MU-2 while the FAA fails to provide at least an outline of a safety review."

From 1983-2005, 45 MU-2s fatally crashed in the United States, killing 120 people in cargo and other crashes, records show.

The Mitsubishi has spoilers instead of ailerons, the small hinged sections of the wing that help control the plane's bank. Some think this feature can make the plane hard to handle in times of stress, a point the company disputes.

"It is especially important for airmen who do not fly the MU-2 exclusively to be aware that performance expectations and control techniques common in other turboprop twins do not necessarily transfer to flying the MU-2," FAA Flight Standards Service Director James J. Ballough wrote.

"The MU-2 has always been looked at as something of a hot rod in terms of small turboprop aircraft," said FAA spokesman Les Dorr. "That said, if you rely on your training and rely on your procedures in the manual, you should be able to fly the aircraft without a problem. ... That is not to say we won't order changes."

In fact, a new FAA report said the MU-2's accident rate is twice as high, and its fatality rate 2.5 times higher than similar twin turboprops designed in the same era -- contradicting earlier claims.

Its rate of fatal accidents involving loss of control during emergencies was seven times higher, the report found.

Now the FAA is suggesting increased and standardized training for pilots, testing of pilot skills and upgraded maintenance training.

Said Sorrells: "That's the one good thing we will get out of this congressional involvement here. The FAA will now require mandatory training ... just what we've asked for."